Wa's the big deal? A deep dive into the UWSA and SSPP deployments into Shan State
On July 11th, the military and political scene in Burma was uprooted as 2,000 soldiers from the United Wa State Army crossed the Salween River from their bases in the Wa Self-Administered Division and fanned out from the town of Tangyan across much of central Shan State. The next day, a column of roughly 1,000 troops with the UWSA-allied Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP/SSA-N) moved from their headquarters in Wan Hai to join Wa troops and seize control of Mong Yai town.
These movements are somewhat of a crossroads for the Burmese Spring Revolution in Shan State, effectively ruling out the capture of these areas by the Three Brotherhood Alliance which has been able to seize much of Northern Shan State since last October. But the moves prompt far more questions than answers.
This update will specifically focus on these deployments with a broader update on the developments in Burma and the progress of Operation 1027 pt 2 later this week.
There has largely been an information black hole regarding these changes since video was first published with large columns of UWSA and SSPP troops moving into key towns across the region, and none of the crucial questions have been answered publicly by any of the involved actors. At its core, we see interacting spheres of control best viewed through an ecological lens highlighting the overlapping webs of cooperative and competitive relations in areas of mixed control across Shan State.
The most strategic question is to which degree these deployments are accommodating of both 3BHA resistance groups and Junta armed forces. These actions do not fit within a clear binary of revolutionary or Junta support but instead represent a pragmatic attempt to extend zones of control and influence. However, within the complex conflict ecology of Shan State, the deployments do have significant implications across the region.
But first, we need to give context to the relevant groups and detail the recent developments.
History and Context
Both the United Wa State Army and the Shan State Progressive Party (also known by their armed wing the Shan State Army - North. Generally, I have been referring to groups by the armed wing, but the similarities between the Shan State Army - North and their rivals the Shan State Army - South make the use of their political wings clearer) have a long-standing and strong presence in Shan State. The UWSA hold and administers a large fiefdom to the east of the Salween River, and has maintained almost sole control over that area since the 1989 Communist Party of Burma mutinies. The SSPP has a significant presence in many townships across Shan State, ranging from Kyaukme and Hsipaw, in the midsts of these recent clashes, to their headquarters in Wan Hai 125km to the South-East to the Taunggyi-Kengtung Highway.
The spread of ACLED events involving the SSPP since 2013.
Both groups are core members of the FPNCC, a coalition of Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) formed in 2017 and chaired by the UWSA to include EAOs that were clashing with the Tatmadaw and excluded from the negotiations with the Burmese government. Particularly, ties between the SSPP and UWSA are deep and go back decades. This history is far too expansive to include here (I would love to explore it further in later deep dives), but the initial 1976 split of the Shan State Army (that continues to this day) was born from leadership disagreements over relations with forces that would become the UWSA. As early as 1977, communiques declared the two groups as a progressive and revolutionary united front.
Both groups initially signed a ceasefire with the Burmese government in 1988/1989 and despite occasional (sometimes fierce) clashes with the SSPP, the groups have remained relatively stable since then.
Since the outbreak of the Spring Revolution immediately following the 2021 coup, both groups have been engaged with the junta-established National Solidarity and Peace Negotiation Committee (NSPNC) and met directly with the Military Council. The UWSA has largely acted as an extension of Beijing’s post-coup Burma policy, remaining mostly apolitical and focused on economic development, careful to not overtly support revolutionary non-state armed groups. The SSPP however, has been more nuanced, it has provided rhetorical support to the broader resistance movement, and repeatedly articulated the need to end the military dictatorship. In May, the group even sparked speculation that it would join the armed revolution with a speech for the Shan National Day where its Vice-Chairman said that “faced with an intolerable situation, we have no choice but to pursue the path of armed revolution”. However, given the large exposure SSPP positions have to Junta forces (most SSPP positions exist alongside junta-controlled areas in an uneasy peace), the group has not been willing to engage in clashes with the junta.
Instead of a focus on the Junta and Military Council, the SSPP (and UWSA) has focused instead on the RCSS/SSA-S, a rival Shan Ethnic Armed Organisation that traces its genealogy back to the 1976 split within the SSPP over communist ideology. Since 2017, according to ACLED data, 85% of clashes involving the SSPP have been against other EAOs.
These tensions date back to 2015 when a sustained, multi-month offensive by the Burmese Army against the SSPP forced it to retreat from much of the area in Northern Shan State under its influence, and the RCSS - having signed a ceasefire with the Burmese Army earlier in 2015 - moved across the traditional north-south divide and established an armed presence in much of this territory.
The SSPP was able to defend its headquarters against the Burmese army assault, and following years of regrouping, allied with the UWSA in early 2021 to expel RCSS troops from much of this area. In May 2021, 3,000 UWSA troops crossed the Salween River and helped the SSPP to reclaim its influence over much of Northern Shan State from the RCSS, with clashes especially fierce in the areas of Kyaukme, Kyethi, Namtu and Hsipaw. The Junta that took power in February 2021 largely stayed out of these clashes and allowed both the RCSS and SSPP to operate in these areas following ceasefire agreements (though it should be mentioned that the RCSS has been a far more supportive actor towards the Junta military council).
An animation showing the number of clashes between the SSPP and RCSS by township and year, according to ACLED data. It is clear that following the 2021 assistance from the UWSA, the SSPP was able to significantly push the RCSS southwards and largely expel them from Northern Shan State.
This changed in late 2023, however, as the major military offensive, Operation 1027 was launched by troops with the Three Brotherhood Alliance and began to expel the military from much of Northern Shan State. From the perspective of the SSPP, much of the territory that they had just fought the RCSS over was now being captured by the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA). Relations between the SSPP and the TNLA have been good, with the two even fighting together on many occasions in the past, but the SSPP clearly viewed some of these military moves by the TNLA - not incorrectly - as an expansion of the nationalist Ta’ang militia into traditionally Shan areas, and thus usurping the SSPP’s sphere of influence in these areas.
This sparked panic among the SSPP and prompted a ceasefire to be signed between the SSPP and the RCSS, as the SSPP sought to bolster its presence across Northern Shan State, especially in the Kyaukme and Hsipaw areas.
These moves undoubtedly put the SSPP between a rock and a hard place being either unable or unwilling to join armed resistance against the Junta, but seeing its traditional power base dissolving away in favour of armed groups willing to expel the junta and capture territory. Despite overwhelming defeats of the Junta military council across much of Northern Shan State, it was able to withstand the TNLA offensives along the main highway between Pyin-Oo-Lwin and Lashio. Therefore, although weakened, the Junta was the primary territory-holding actor in practically all of the territory with a strong SSPP presence and largely tolerated SSPP presence in these areas. If the SSPP chose to join in on armed resistance, this presence would likely not continue to be tolerated and many SSPP positions would likely be attacked. However, the will of the Shan people in Burma is clearly behind the revolution, and continued inaction in the face of sustained Junta defeats would cede both territory and popular support to non-Shan nationalist groups that are willing to fight.
In early June, the UWSA, supportive of the SSPP in this predicament, sent a further column of thousands of troops across the Salween River and into Shan State. This occurred as the military situation between the 3BHA and Junta forces was escalating, and it appeared that the fragile ceasefire in place since January might soon fail.
Three weeks later, this is exactly what happened. The TNLA launched what it called Operation 1027 part 2, and rapidly captured the towns of Nawnghkio and Kyaukme, sparking a crisis among the SSPP as many former SSPP outposts came under TNLA control. The offensive has not assaulted the town of Hsipaw, seemingly in a sign of goodwill towards the SSPP which maintains a significant presence within the town, but undoubtedly many of the SSPP’s worst fears are coming to fruition with these gains by the TNLA. The TNLA generally believes that since it is the army challenging and defeating the Junta, it has a rightful claim to many of these areas. On the other hand, the SSPP believes that as the Junta retreats from areas of long-standing SSPP primacy, it should be the actor to take over these territories despite the military victories by the TNLA.
Beyond the frontal assaults on towns and positions along the Pyin-Oo-Lwin to Lashio highway, these offensives also saw heavy TNLA and MNDAA infiltration into rear areas of junta control, specifically in Tangyan township and near the junction of Tangyan, Mongyai and Lashio townships. Heavy fighting in Lashio, home of the North-East Area Command left Junta forces distracted from these rear areas and likely unable to effectively defend throughout the offensive.
Current Deployments
Beyond the immediate location of UWSA and SSPP troops, very little is known about the current situation. On July 9th, Junta troops with the North-East Area Command in Lashio agreed to a UWSA proposal for them to position troops in Tangyan township and similar arrangements were seemingly made to ensure SSPP control of the neighbouring Mongyai town.
The agreement, according to reporting in the Irrawaddy, seems to stretch from Mong Yaw, 30km to the east of Lashio city, down to the Hoya junction on the Tanyang to Lashio road, and to the Salween River. This is, very roughly, an area of around 5,000 km2, and stretching over 60km west of the UWSA’s traditional control areas east of the Salween River.
Meanwhile, the SSPP appears to have deployed along the Wan Hai to Mongyai road, extending their control approximately 40km north from Wan Hai to join up with the areas granted to the UWSA. The situation between this road and the Salween River is unclear, however, unverified social media posts suggest the UWSA is additionally deployed in this area, and the SSPP has long maintained a significant armed presence throughout that region.
There have been rumours of both the UWSA and SSPP advancing from these areas towards Lashio, but there has not been any evidence suggesting this.
The approximate territory handed over the the UWSA and SSPP in recent weeks.
Behind the Scenes
There has been rampant speculation about the reasoning and agreements that facilitated these deployments in recent weeks, but very few solid facts. What seems clear, is that these deployments are a clear reflection of UWSA strength in contrast to a waning Junta, and a self-interested move to expand SSPP influence and relevance in the context of a Revolution that is rapidly evolving in Shan State without the SSPP.
Despite acquiescence from the Military Council to these requests, I do not expect that they are done in support of continued Junta presence in the region. The ruling Junta probably does see UWSA or SSPP control of these regions as preferable to them being captured by the MNDAA or TNLA, but it seems unlikely that they would allow it without significant and forceful pressure behind the ‘request’, especially given the recent turbulent history between the Tatmadaw and the SSPP and that groups rhetorical support for the revolution.
Behind the scenes since the deployment has also seen a flurry of diplomatic meetings, with the heads of the 3BHA armed groups meeting in China, with Chinese diplomats pressuring a series of temporary ceasefires that started last week to coincide with Beijing’s 3rd Plenary Session. TNLA leaders have met with the SSPP in the Wa capital in an attempt to resolve the multitude of disputes between the two groups.
On the positive side, these developments are a continuation of a trend present throughout Burma since the launch of the Spring Revolution; that of relative compromise and a desire to resolve disputes below the threshold of violence. Across groups (both explicitly revolutionary and broadly self-interested), there seems to be a much more congruent idea of what a future federalised and democratic Myanmar will look like, and a greater degree of flexibility and compromise to resolve differences.
This suggests that there may be hope for common ground between members of the 3BHA and the SSPP/UWSA on the composition and zones of influence of varying actors across Shan State as the status quo is shattered under a largely defeated Junta.
Questions remaining
These deployments essentially rule out the capture of Tangyan and Mongyai by troops with the Three Brotherhood Alliance, none of those actors want to launch concerted attacks against other EAOs, but the level of accommodation towards varying groups by the newly deployed UWSA and SSPP will be crucial for the strategic outlook of Shan State and the Junta’s North-East Area Command. They may be permissive to both revolutionary and Junta troops passing through, staging and even maintaining a permanent military presence in these newly gained areas. Or they may restrict, to varying degrees any or all actors also seeking a presence in those areas.
The Junta has significant military investments and garrisons in the newly gained UWSA/SSPP areas, including an advanced military training school, three battalions and a brigade-level Tactical Operations Command, along with several outposts conducting artillery and combat operations in the defence of Lashio.
Meanwhile, in any assault on Lashio, the MNDAA will rely on transit through these areas and, crucially, the denial of combat operations from Junta units in defence of positions being assaulted as part of Operation 1027 pt 2.
Presently, there are no indications of how the UWSA is operating in these regards. There have been numerous reports that some units of Junta troops were expelled to Taunggyi, but certainly not the bulk of the troops that were garrisoned in the newly gained townships. Some reporting has suggested that the UWSA intends to expel Junta military camps in the area but not as an urgent priority - but this reporting is poorly sourced and I scarcely consider it more than speculation.
There have been some complaints by the TNLA that the SSPP allowed safe passage to Junta columns to reinforce Kyaukme through SSPP-controlled territory, but it is unclear whether this was allowed by the SSPP or whether the units snuck through amidst the initial confusion of newly established positions and general movements through the area.
Members of the 3BHA have not publicly complained about their passage being restricted by either the SSPP or the UWSA.
Pro-Junta media has reacted positively to the news of these deployments, even suggesting that the UWSA and the Junta military forces could form a unified front against the 3BHA. This is not realistic, and almost certainly just over-zealous commentators latching on to any piece of news that can be spun in a positive light to Junta-supporters, but it is still clear from these reactions that the pro-Junta establishment does not view these deployments as an existential threat to their continued presence in the region. This optimism would mean little, however, in the middle of orders by the UWSA for Junta troops to withdraw and probably does not reflect the sentiment on the ground.
There has also been speculation that these deployments are an element of Chinese policy being implemented by the UWSA to establish new trading routes to the Burmese Junta that exist outside of the control of explicitly revolutionary groups and preempt the takeover of these territories from revolutionary groups. However, the most established border and road infrastructure East of the Salween goes through Mongla and Kengtung into territory under the firm control of the Junta, and it is not immediately evident what, if any, benefits a new trade route through UWSA territory and into contested territory would bring over the Mongla route.
Generally, these developments can be viewed along a spectrum of revolutionary support and Junta-accommodation, it is neither of those extremes and will likely be quite fluid following the self-interest of the UWSA and SSPP. I expect that it will trend towards more revolutionary support as the Junta’s position in the region becomes more tenous and less threatening to the SSPP, but right now, it is entirely unclear.
The Ecological Lens
In terms of life sciences, ecology differs from regular biology or zoology in that instead of just studying the organism, it focuses on the complex and interconnected web of (especially) cooperative and competitive relationships between individuals and taxa. In the context of Shan State, where there are deeply overlapping and intersecting zones of territorial control between armed groups with long histories, genealogies and relations within the state, this lens becomes much more informative than a sense of territorial control.
Thus, the deployment of UWSA and SSPP troops into Northern Shan State is more usefully viewed as the pragmatic leveraging of cooperative relationships to seek advantage in areas of competition rather than the explicit expansion of territorial control. They are looking to establish viable alternatives beyond either the Junta Military Council or the Ta’ang or Kokang nationalist movements capturing much of the state and to do this below the threshold of violence. It is a fine line, within the highly polarised situation in Myanmar, neutrality can be considered support for the Junta, and this would introduce challenges to this goal of a Shan-led alternative given the immense unpopularity of the Junta across the state.
It will take far longer than two weeks for these new ecological contours to be established and for the balance to stabilise into a new status quo. It is wrong to view these deployments as either a pro-or-anti-revolutionary act, it is a pragmatic, self-interested act that may end up favouring either the resistance or the Junta. The Junta can only offer threats, violence and preferential economic deals, but the revolution can offer a broadly supported common vision for Burma’s future. As the Junta’s military and administrative presence weakens, both nationally and in Shan State specifically, their coercion will become less effective and the resistance’s offerings will become more appealing to pragmatic actors that are sitting on the fence.